Problem, research strategy, and findings: Advocates of community benefits agreements (CBAs) between coalitions of nongovernmental organizations and real estate developers contend that CBAs promote public accountability and responsiveness to community concerns. This study assesses the Los Angeles Sports and Entertainment District CBA, which scholars and practitioners have described as a model for such agreements. I assess compliance with key provisions of the agreement related to jobs, affordable housing, and parks and recreational facilities. I also assess whether compliance with these provisions has yielded benefits beyond those required under existing laws and regulations. I find that the parties to the agreement have technically complied with many, although arguably not all, of its provisions. But some of the provisions in the CBA are not legally binding, other provisions overlap with requirements that the developer would have had to satisfy even without the CBA, and some reports required by the CBA are unavailable. As a result, outcomes such as living wage jobs and funding for affordable housing units are not clearly attributable to the CBA; other outcomes, such as targeted hiring, are unknown due to a lack of relevant information.
community benefits from the developer in exchange for the community groups' support of (or non-opposition to) [a] project" (Gross, 2012, p. 229) . Prominent CBAs have been associated with urban infill development projects that include some combination of retail, residential, office, entertainment, professional sports, and hotel uses (Been, Levine, Moskowitz, O'Brien, & Sheffer, 2010; Salkin & Lavine, 2008; Task Force on Public Benefit Agreements, 2010; Wolf-Powers, 2010) . Typically, these projects are privately owned and operated, but they receive public support through some combination of rezoning, tax advantages, direct subsidies, financial guarantees, land write-downs, infrastructure development, and the exercise of eminent domain. The term "CBA" has been in widespread use for little more than a decade, 4 but Parks & Warren (2009, p. 91) indicate that seventeen to fifty "self-proclaimed" CBAs had been negotiated in the US as of 2008. This estimate suggests that CBAs have become increasingly common features of urban development projects in the past fifteen years. 5 Three changes in the legal and political landscape of urban development during the past five decades help to explain the emergence of CBAs. First, beginning around 1970, the federal government and many state governments created new ways for non-governmental organizations to intervene in the development process (Altshuler & Luberoff, 2003, pp. 230-234) . For example, under the California Environmental Quality Act, non-governmental organizations can bring lawsuits against the government, alleging inadequate analysis of the impacts of public-private redevelopment projects. By threatening to delay or derail a redevelopment project with lawsuits, non-governmental organizations can gain clout when negotiating a CBA with a developer.
Second, beginning later in the 1970s, reductions in federal aid and restrictions on property taxes impelled cities to undertake a new form of deal-making with private developers Marantz, N. J. What Do Community Benefits Agreements Deliver? Evidence from Los Angeles. Accepted Manuscript. Version of Record: Journal of the American Planning Association 81(4), pp. 251-267 (2015) , DOI 10.1080 DOI 10. /01944363.2015 -6 - (Sagalyn, 1990) . The resulting deals typically required cities to provide financial incentives such as property tax abatements and tax-advantaged bond financing. These off-budget subsidies frequently hid significant public costs.
Third, by the mid-1990s, labor advocacy organizations began to criticize public-private deal-making as a source of largely invisible public spending that generated low-wage jobs with little potential for economic mobility (see, e.g., LeRoy, 1997) . National labor advocacy organizations and allied regional groups began to view approval processes for subsidized redevelopment projects as opportunities to expand organizing campaigns related to low-wage service jobs in hotel, office, and retail projects (Cummings, 2007 (Cummings, , pp. 1944 (Cummings, -1945 Khalil & Hinson, 1998, pp. 19-27; Luce, 2005, pp. 50-51; Parks & Warren, 2009, p. 91; Zabin & Martin, 1999, pp. 12-18) . In Los Angeles, the resulting campaigns fostered collaboration among public officials, labor representatives, and community organizers (Frank & Wong, 2004; Meyerson, 2006; Montgomery, 2011, pp. 80-87, 95-102) . The LASED CBA was one product of this collaboration.
CBAs may be a recent innovation, but real estate developers have long offered benefits in order to gain local government approvals or avoid litigation. Local government officials frequently negotiate such benefits on an ad hoc, project-by-project basis (Camacho, 2005, pp. 15-33) . 6 Local governments often incorporate the negotiated benefits into regulatory documents. For example, some states, including California, authorize local governments to enter into contractual development agreements (DAs). Under a DA, a local government essentially freezes the regulations applicable to a development project in exchange for benefits provided by a developer (Callies, Curtin, & Tappendorf, 2003, pp. 91-115) . 7 Marantz, N. J. What Do Community Benefits Agreements Deliver? Evidence from Los Angeles. Accepted Manuscript. Version of Record: Journal of the American Planning Association 81(4), pp. 251-267 (2015) , DOI 10.1080 DOI 10. /01944363.2015 A widely cited advocacy primer on CBAs stresses that a CBA should be independent of public regulatory agreements such as DAs, so that community groups do not have to rely on local government for enforcement (Gross et al., 2005, p. 10) . Gross et al. (2005, pp. 21-22) suggest that CBAs can address community concerns, foster new alliances among nongovernmental organizations, and ensure the legal enforceability of a developer's promises, while helping members of the public and government officials to understand a developer's commitments and monitor the delivery of the promised benefits. Gross et al. (2005) also describe the attributes important for successful CBAs. They recommend extensive outreach by community-based groups in order to ascertain a community's needs, coupled with collaboration between these groups and organized labor, in order to build a broad, politically potent coalition (pp. 6, 14). They advise CBA coalitions to appoint a relatively small negotiating team or a steering committee, including members with relevant expertise, to negotiate with a developer's representatives (pp. 11, 26) . If an attorney represents a developer in the negotiations, the CBA coalition should also negotiate through an attorney (pp. 11, 23). Gross et al. (2005) emphasize that a CBA should specify monitoring and enforcement mechanisms for any commitments made by developers, including public reporting requirements, and that such commitments should also bind any subsequent purchasers of property in the project (pp. 14, 70). In addition, while Gross et al. indicate that a CBA should be independent of a DA, they also recommend that the parties to a CBA should try to have the CBA incorporated into such public agreements, so that the CBA will also be enforceable by local government (p. 10). (Been, 2010, pp. 29-31; Freeman, 2007; Rosenblum, 2013; Santos, 2009) . The text of the LASED CBA, moreover, is publicly available, unlike some other CBAs (Been, 2010, p. 22) .
The Negotiation of the LASED CBA
On May 3, 2000, the owners of the Staples Center arena in downtown Los Angeles announced plans to transform the surrounding property into a master-planned district including retail, entertainment, hotel, office, and residential uses (Newton, 2000) . The Staples Center, home to professional sports teams including the Los Angeles Lakers, had opened the preceding year (Boucher & Rohrlich, 1999) . It was part of a broader plan to create an entertainment district and a hotel to service the adjacent convention center, shown in Figure 1 (Comrie & Deaton, 1997) . As shown in Figure 2 , this proposed development (later called the LASED) was located amidst some of the poorest census tracts in the City of Los Angeles. As Table 1 indicates, the initial plan included 4 million square feet of retail, entertainment, residential, hotel, office, and convention uses; by 2010 the planned build-out had increased to 6.29 million square feet of new development.
[INSERT FIGURES 1 AND 2 AND After the developers' announcement, organizers associated with community groups and labor unions sought to ensure that the master-planned project would benefit nearby residents (Cummings, 2008, p. 61; Saito, 2012, pp. 139-141) . The organizers combined outreach to other non-governmental organizations with extensive efforts to engage residents of low-income communities near the proposed project (Haas, 2002, pp. 92-93; Leavitt, 2006, p. 264;  Montgomery, 2011, pp. 103-108, 119-122; Saito, 2012, pp. 139-141) . The group that emerged under the aegis of the Figueroa Corridor Coalition for Economic Justice comprised, at its largest, twenty-nine organizations, including two labor unions, and roughly 300 individuals living close to the arena (Cummings, 2008, p. 62) .
The coalition sought an independent means of obtaining a range of benefits, in part, because of enforcement and accountability problems plaguing the City of Los Angeles and its
Community Redevelopment Agency at that time. The city had enacted a living wage ordinance in 1997, which applied to certain employers receiving public subsidies. But an evaluation prepared for the city council characterized the relevant city agency's strategy for implementing the living wage ordinance as "remarkably passive" (Sander & Loki, 1998, p. 8) . Labor organizations that had lobbied for the living wage ordinance sought a variety of alternative mechanisms to implement the law, including CBAs (Frank & Wong, 2004, pp. 173-175; Luce, 2005, pp. 50-51; Zabin & Martin, 1999, pp. 12-18) . In addition, a city controller's audit revealed that the Community Redevelopment Agency was doing "a poor job ensuring that the public receives the benefits promised in exchange for subsidies given to private developers,"
and the controller noted that the agency frequently failed to "verify that the units created for low to moderate income housing are actually being used for that purpose" (Chick, 2004, p The coalition gained political leverage by including labor organizations, but this alliance also limited the scope of the coalition's demands (Cummings, 2008, p. 63 (Montgomery, 2011, p. 125) . Some coalition members sought a total rethinking of the project, based on "international best practices of how older neighborhoods and regional attractions have been designed to complement each other and coexist" (López Mendoza, 2001a, p. 41) , but this did not occur. Moreover, most of the environmental mitigation measures proposed by the coalition were not ultimately adopted (López Mendoza, 2001b ).
The coalition also gained leverage from a threat to challenge the project under the California Environmental Quality Act (Cummings, 2008, pp. 63-66; Haas, 2002, pp. 91-93) , although the intra-coalitional pressures may have militated against litigation. As Koff explained, the president of the hotel workers' union (an important member of the CBA coalition) was wary of tactics that could delay the project, which seemed likely to produce many permanent union jobs (Montgomery, 2011, pp. 103-104; cf. Cummings, 2008, p. 63) .
Such jobs would be guaranteed by agreements between unions and employers that were separate from the CBA.
Seasoned negotiators and experienced legal counsel represented the coalition in its formal negotiations with representatives of the developer of the LASED, the Anschutz Entertainment Group (AEG) (Cummings, 2008; Haas, 2012) . The negotiation culminated in a CBA that applied to certain subsidiaries of AEG and to any developers who might later Table 2 .
The CBA's jobs provisions consisted primarily of non-binding goals concerning employment outcomes and binding requirements mandating public reports, conferral with coalition representatives, and compliance with existing laws. The non-binding goals indicated that at least 70% of permanent jobs in the LASED would be "living wage jobs" (as defined in the CBA), and that 50% of jobs available during any six-month period would be filled by targeted job applicants, such as low-income individuals living within a three mile radius of the LASED. The CBA also required AEG to inform the coalition about prospective tenants, to arrange for coalition representatives to meet with prospective tenants, to provide annual reports to the city indicating the percentage of living wage jobs in the LASED, and to comply with the city's living wage law. The CBA did not require AEG to administer the targeted hiring program or submit the relevant reports to the city. Instead, it assigned these responsibilities to a nonprofit organization, to be selected by the coalition and AEG at a later date, with AEG required to pay up to $100,000 for these services.
The CBA also included binding requirements concerning affordable housing. AEG for the off-site units. As a result, the city ultimately limited these obligations to $40,000 per required unit, as discussed below.
The CBA also guaranteed $1,000,000 for parks and recreational facilities, and it required AEG to pay up to $75,000 for a needs assessment to ensure community input on how to spend these funds. The CBA required the projects receiving these funds to be completed within five years of the completion of the needs assessment. In addition, the coalition pledged to support AEG's application for credits towards the city's impact fees for parks and recreational facilities.
Three months after it signed the CBA, AEG -with support from coalition memberssecured approvals from the Los Angeles City Council, including adoption of a DA incorporating the CBA (Los Angeles City Council File No. 00-0813). The city subsequently provided subsidies for the project estimated in 2005 at a net present value of $82 million (Fujioka & Miller, 2005, pp. 2-3) .
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]
The LASED CBA as a Test Case
The LASED CBA fulfilled the criteria that Gross et al. (2005) indicate are important to increase accountability and produce measurable outcomes. As a result, it is an important test case for the claims of advocates about the value of CBAs (see George & Bennett, 2005 , pp. The interview subjects included three private attorneys, ten current or former government officials, one former employee of a non-profit environmental advocacy organization, three employees of labor organizations, two private development consultants, three academics, three community organizers, two employees of a business advocacy organization, and three employees of development firms. I conducted the interviews in person and via telephone based on a tentative outline of the topics and subtopics that I wished to cover. The outlines were based on a review of relevant documents as well as any prior interviews. I requested permission to record the interviews, to use the interviewees' names and titles, and to quote the interviewees. I provided the interviewees with the opportunity decline any of these requests. If an interviewee specifically requested the opportunity to approve quotes prior to publication, I provided such an opportunity. When interviewees declined to discuss a specific topic and explained their reticence, I noted the reason. (In some instances, conflicted with other information I had obtained, I addressed the apparent conflict either during the interview or in a follow-up e-mail exchange. I also relied on e-mail to address other followup questions and to confirm details of interviews that I did not record.
My approach has three significant limitations. First, while the LASED CBA has been widely cited as a model CBA, it was also arguably the first CBA in the US. As a result, problems encountered in the implementation of the LASED CBA may have been addressed only in subsequent CBAs. (Because evaluation of CBA outcomes is possible only after a CBA has been in place for some time, the outcomes of comparatively recent CBAs are less susceptible to evaluation.
) Second, open-ended, semi-structured interviews invariably produce incomplete and contested accounts (Wildavsky & Hammer, 1989) , and I therefore avoid relying on any single interview for my conclusions. Third, my focus on outcomes that are relatively reducible to dollar amounts precludes analysis of the coalition development and capacity building that CBA advocates cite as rationales for CBAs.
Implementation and Outcomes of the LASED CBA
I address my research questions by discussing, in turn, each major category of CBA provisions: jobs, affordable housing, and parks and recreation.
Jobs
The LASED CBA contained both non-binding goals and binding requirements related to jobs. The non-binding goals addressed wages and targeted hiring. Binding requirements included mandates for public reports indicating attainment (or non-attainment) of the non- Saucedo, April 10, 2015) . This subsection therefore focuses on the CBA provisions related to the implementation of the reporting requirements and attainment of the living wage and targeted hiring goals.
The CBA required AEG to submit an annual report to the city indicating the status of the 70% living wage goal, and it also indicated that the non-profit administrator of the targeted hiring program would submit annual reports to the city, providing detailed information about the employment of targeted job applicants in the LASED. AEG did not comply with its public reporting obligation until 2014. 8 The 2014 report, summarized in Table 3 , indicates that the project attained the 70% living wage goal by 2013, but it does not indicate whether the project was in compliance prior to 2013. Despite repeated inquiries, I was unable to obtain the targeted hiring reports from the non-profit entity responsible for submitting those reports to the city, and neither the city clerk nor AEG had any record of such reports.
9
Although the living wage goal was reportedly attained by 2013, the role of the CBA in attaining that goal is ambiguous for three reasons. First, many employers in the LASED were probably covered by the city's living wage law, independent of the CBA. 10 Although the law was not vigorously enforced immediately following its enactment in 1997, amendments to the city's administrative code and charter during the ensuing four years strengthened the law.
Second, many jobs in the LASED, including those in the hotels, are covered by collective bargaining agreements between employers and labor unions. 11 Under the CBA, jobs covered Table 3 indicates, LASED tenants include businesses such as a law firm, a marketing firm, and a broadcast network, which presumably must exceed the CBA's living wage requirements in order to attract qualified employees.
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE]
The CBA, however, may have served as an important symbol in a long-term labor campaign that resulted in a stronger living wage law and the city's 2015 adoption of an ordinance that would increase the citywide minimum wage to $15 per hour by 2020 (Reyes & Zahniser, 2015) . Soja (2014, p. 236) , for example, invokes the LASED CBA as an example of the Los Angeles labor movement's innovative efforts to promote social justice.
Affordable Housing
The affordable housing provisions of the LASED CBA focused on the development of units suitable for families with household incomes at or below 80% of an administratively determined area median income. The CBA required AEG to provide $650,000 in interest-free three-year loans to specified affordable housing developers. More significantly, it also required all residential developers in the LASED to either develop or subsidize one affordable unit for every five housing units in the LASED. Yet, ambiguous language in the CBA ultimately allowed the LASED developers to fulfill the latter requirement in a way that covered only a fraction of the development cost for each required affordable unit. Moreover, although the CBA prioritized housing suitable for families, most of the units completed in fulfillment of the CBA are in a dormitory.
The CBA allowed developers to meet their housing obligations either on-or off-site. In either case, the CBA required developers of market-rate housing in the LASED to "develop or ). In addition, the revised DA allowed the developers to claim half-credits for affordable units in projects that had already received building permits, if the developers provided gap financing other than the three-year interest-free loans required by the CBA. As Table 4 indicates, AEG obtained forty-six half-credits for gap financing contributions to ninety-two units in two off-site projects, at an average cost of $24,620 per half-credit. As permitted by the CBA, AEG also obtained an additional 7.5 credits for fifteen units subsidized with one of the interest-free three-year loans required by the CBA. 12 Coalition members noted Riccitiello, 2013a , attachment C, p. 2), and many of the sources in Table 4 have not been officially audited or certified. My research suggests that the LASED developers made contributions with a total nominal value of $13,185,000. This figure, which excludes the $650,000 in interest-free loans, represents roughly ten percent of the total development cost of 366 units in five projects.
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE]
The revised DA also authorized one of the new developers, Figueroa South Land, to obtain affordable housing credits for its contributions to the construction of 200 dormitory units at an off-site YWCA. These units would be restricted to individuals aged 16 to 24 participating in an employment-training program for at-risk youth (Fixmer, 2005; Ovrom, 2005) . A coalition attorney objected to this provision before the city council adopted the revised DA, arguing that it conflicted with the CBA's requirement that -in connection with any off-site affordable units -the developers would give priority consideration to projects suitable for families (Perlmutter, 2005) . But, in exchange for contributions to a community land trust, the coalition agreed not to press its case against Figueroa South Land (Cummings,
2008, p. 68). As a result of this agreement, AEG and the parent company of Figueroa South
Land each contributed $200,000 to the land trust (Saito & Truong, 2015, p. 276 Table 5 indicates that, as a result of this compromise, 200 of the 377 affordable units for which the LASED developers may receive partial or full credit are unsuitable for families.
One-hundred-seventy-six of the remaining 177 income-restricted units, which AEG subsidized, are 2-, 3-, and 4-bedroom units that are suitable for families. All of the units in Table 5 satisfy the income-targeting requirements of the CBA, although it is notable that -apart from the YWCA dormitory -all of the relevant housing developments were subsidized by the federal
Low Income Housing Tax Credit program (LIHTC) (US Department of Housing and Urban
Development, 2014). As Table 6 indicates, this program imposed even more stringent income targeting restrictions than the LASED CBA. As Table 5 indicates, the affordable projects It is instructive to compare the LASED project to one nearby that was not developed under a CBA. Metropolitan Lofts, a 264-unit housing development one block away from the LASED, is depicted in Figure 1 ; the income targeting requirements for affordable units in this project were even more stringent than those of the LASED CBA. Because Metropolitan Lofts received LIHTC subsidies, the city's Community Redevelopment Agency required the Metropolitan Lofts developer to allocate at least 20% of the units to "very low-income" 
Parks & Recreational Facilities
The CBA was designed to ensure funds for parks and recreational facilities serving the low-income communities in the area surrounding the LASED. AEG agreed to spend up to $75,000 on a needs assessment for this area and then to provide $1,000,000 to fund the parks and recreational facilities consistent with the needs assessment. The CBA required the funded -21 -projects to be completed within five years of the needs assessment; it also required the coalition to support AEG's requests for credits against the city's existing impact fees for parks and recreation, based on AEG's cash contributions.
My research shows that AEG complied with the CBA's funding requirements for parks and recreational facilities, contributing to the construction of a recreation center and improvements to a city park. The park improvements were finished within the time frame required by the CBA, but the recreation center was completed almost six years after the date required by the CBA. 15 Both of the facilities to which AEG contributed funds were also supported by other funding sources. The recreation center, which was developed by the city's
Community Redevelopment Agency and a non-profit community hospital, required at least $5.9 million in public subsidies above AEG's contribution of $500,000 (Essel, 2012, p. 3 & attachment B) . AEG's contribution of $500,000 for the city park improvements covered roughly 60% of the cost (City of Los Angeles, Department of Recreation and Parks, 2005 Parks, , 2007 .
Moreover, the $1 million contribution made by AEG under the CBA may not represent a net contribution to public recreation facilities, because those funds can be substituted for some fees that would have been required of any developer in the area containing the LASED.
Unfortunately we lack good information on the impact fees paid by the LASED developers (see Riccitiello, 2013a , attachment C, p. 1). But, in a 2013 lawsuit, a non-profit organization responsible for maintaining a park near the LASED alleged that the city's Community Redevelopment Agency had relieved the LASED developers from paying maintenance fees for the park, because of the CBA contributions made by the developers. 16 An agreement involving the agency, the city, and the LASED developers indicates that the agency and the city Coalition members were not necessarily concerned that the developers could offset their contributions against existing impact and development fees. Some coalition members felt they gained more control over the developers' contributions than they would have had over fees paid to city agencies. One of the coalition attorneys explains, "…what we wanted was funds that the coalition could have control of, [rather than fees] which disappeared into [a city account] and no one ever saw again" (interview with Jerilyn López Mendoza, April 17, 2014).
The LASED CBA, overall, appears to have succeeded in the goal of directing funds to parks and recreational services in under-served communities near the LASED. At the same time it may not have produced a net increase in spending on parks and recreation. Nor did it ensure the timely completion of one of the two funded projects, even though the CBA included a strict timetable for project completion.
Lessons of the LASED CBA
My research suggests that the developers subject to the LASED CBA technically satisfied most of the CBA's requirements related to jobs, affordable housing, and parks and recreation, but the effect of this compliance on outcomes is ambiguous. In particular, it is not clear that the LASED CBA yielded jobs, affordable housing units, or parks and recreation facilities beyond those that would have resulted from municipal mandates, federal regulations, and agreements between unions and employers. Moreover, the history of the implementation of the LASED CBA shows how difficult it is for community groups, even those supported by expert advisors, to anticipate all contingencies or to effectively monitor all relevant outcomes. Overall, my research on the LASED CBA suggests that the outcomes of such agreements are not clear-cut. It is difficult to discern the outcomes attributable to a CBA when they overlap with the mandates of government programs or agreements between unions and employers. It is also difficult to calculate how much private developers actually spend on promised benefits, in part because it is hard to ascertain the extent of normal development fees and costs that are forgiven because of developers' CBA spending. Moreover, even measuring the benefits described in a CBA -whether or not those benefits are attributable to a CBArequires substantial effort. Collecting and verifying the necessary data may be challenging, even if reporting requirements are clearly spelled out in the CBA. And as the complexity of a CBA increases, so do the challenges of assessing outcomes and assigning responsibility for those outcomes.
Nevertheless, it does appear that CBAs can play important roles in community development if their potential is not overstated and community participants are aware of the pitfalls. CBAs can give community coalitions an independent mechanism to ensure that developers satisfy their pre-existing legal obligations and that governments adequately enforce existing laws and policies. CBAs can also direct public spending to under-served neighborhoods.
It is crucial to closely monitor and evaluate the growing number of CBAs across the US to ensure that they fulfill these important roles, although it is not clear who will conduct this monitoring. There is no guarantee that a community coalition will diligently monitor , 1998, 1999) . 4 See note 1, above. 5 Any such estimate is inherently imprecise, both because some CBAs may not be publicly announced and because different people have defined the term differently. 6 As a legal matter, local governments have broad discretion in requesting concessions for direct subsidies (Been, 2010, p. 34) . By contrast, for certain contributions exacted as conditions of land-use approvals such as environmental permits, the US Supreme Court has held that a government entity must be able to show an "essential nexus" between the contribution and the rationale for the entity's authority to deny the relevant permit. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 836-837 (1987) . In addition, the government entity must also be able to demonstrate that the exacted contribution is "rough [ly] proportional[] … both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development." Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) . These requirements apply not only when a government entity seeks a possessory interest in a permit applicant's land, but also to at least some monetary exactions. Leroy Land Dev. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 939 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1991) . 8 Both a legislative assistant to the relevant city council committee and an attorney for AEG confirmed that AEG submitted no reports related to the living wage goal prior to 2014. It is possible that AEG's eventual compliance with the reporting requirement was a result of this research project. The 2014 living wage report was submitted to the city on the same day that I e-mailed an attorney for AEG, requesting such a report and explaining that the relevant city office had no record of it. 9 Saito and Truong (2015, p. 280) indicate that AEG "has met the CBA goals" related to targeted hiring, but they do not buttress this conclusion with evidence of project-wide compliance for any six-month period, as required by the CBA. Developer to provide up to $100,000 to a non-profit organization, which will "coordinate job training programs with appropriate community-based job training organizations" and "promptly refer qualified, trained applicants to employers for available jobs" in the LASED. Developer to "fund or cause to be privately funded at least … $1,000,000 … for the creation or improvement of one or more parks and recreation facilities … in a manner consistent with the results of the Needs Assessment" described above in row [13] .
Enforceable
In compliance
[15] Parks & Rec.
"The park and recreation facilities created or improved pursuant to this agreement shall be completed within five years of completion of the Needs Assessment" described above in row [13] . Housing and Urban Development (2004, pp. 11-12) .
